A basic result in Intuitionism is Π 0 2 -Conservativity. Take any proof p in Classical Arithmetic of some Π 0 2 -statement (some arithmetical statement ∀x.∃y.P (x, y), with P decidable). Then we may effectively turn p in some intuitionistic proof of the same statement. In a previous paper [1], we generalized this result: any classical proof p of an arithmetical statement ∀x.∃y.P (x, y), with P of degree k, may be effectively turned into some proof of the same statement, using Excluded Middle only over degree k formulas. When k = 0, we get the original conservativity result as particular case. This result was a byproduct of a semantical construction. J. Avigad, of Carnegie Mellon University, found a short, direct syntactical derivation of the same result, using H. Friedman's A-translation. His proof is included here with his permission. 
1 Plan of the paper.
In section 2 we quickly introduce Classical and Intuitionistic Arithmetic, and we state Generalized conservativity. In section 3 we introduce Friedman's A-translation, and we explain how it was used to prove Π 0 2 -conservativity. In section 4 we use Friedman's A-translation to prove Generalized Conservativity.
Generalized Conservativity could look uninteresting, from an intuitionistic viewpoint. Indeed, it produces proofs using Excluded Middle, even if only over degree k formulas. We think of it instead as a metic". We denote Minimal, Intuitionistic and Classical Arithmetic respectively by MA, HA, PA. For any theory T , we denote by T A the statement: "the formula A is derivable in T ". By induction over A we may check that MA 0 = s(t) → A for all A. In Intuitionistic Logic, EM k proves EM h for any h ≤ k (just add vacuous quantifiers in front of A in A ∨ ¬A ). HA proves x = y ∨ x = y (Excluded Middle for equality) using Induction twice. Then it proves (all formulas in) EM 0 out of it. HA cannot prove EM 1 instead. A fortiori, HA proves EM k for no k > 0.
Replacing ⊥ by any formula. If F, A are any formulas, call F [⊥ := A] the result of replacing ⊥ with A everywhere in F (and possibly renaming bound variables, in order to avoid capture of free variables). In any proof of MA we may replace ⊥ by any A, obtaining still a correct proof. The reason is that the only assumption over ⊥ in MA is 0 = s(t) → ⊥, and this axiom becomes 0 = s(t) → A, which is provable in MA.
We intend to prove the following result: 
Friedman's A-translation
Call Gödel's ¬¬-translation of F (see [3] ) the formula F ¬¬ , obtained replacing each sub-formula t = u of F by ¬¬t = u, and each subformula B ∨ C or ∃x.B of F , respectively, by ¬(¬B ∧ ¬C) or ¬∀x.¬B. 2 For instance, ⊥ ¬¬ = ⊥. Gödel's translations of ⊥ → F and F ∨ ¬F are derivable within Minimal Logic. Gödel proved the following:
The proof is by induction over the proof in PA (see [3] ). Gödel 
Fix any formula A. Call Friedman A-translation of F (see [2] ) the formula F ¬¬ [⊥ := A]. 4 For instance:
We may characterize Friedman A-translation as follows.
Just by definition unfolding, we may check that F A is obtained by replacing every atom a in F by a A , and every connective c in F by c A .
We may derive the following Theorem: We may derive Π 0 2 -Conservativity using A-translation. First of all, we remark that we have only to prove Σ 0 1 -Conservativity, which is the statement: if deg(P ) = 0, and PA ∃y.P , then HA ∃y.P . The reason is: for any theory T with Introduction and Elimination of ∀, we have T A iff T ∀x.A. Second, we remark that every degree 0 formula P , with free variables x = x 1 , . . . , x n is equivalent in HA to some equation f (x) = 0 (just take the primitive recursive characteristic map f of P ). Therefore we may assume that P is an equational statement.
The next step is a curious Lemma, which C. Murphy proposed to call "Friedman Topmost Trick". 5 Fix any A = ∃x.P , with P 3 Faithfulness of Gödel's translation might seem to be enough to prove Generalized Conservativity. It is not. If F = ∀x.∃y.P , and
4 Friedman A-translation was originally intended from Intuitionistic to Minimal Logic. To be accurate, therefore, we should call F A "the composition of A-translation with Gödel's translation, applied to F ". We prefer to call F A directly "the A-translation of F ", for short.
5 The proof of this Lemma plays a key role in Continuation Theory. • (∀x.¬P ) A is derivable in Minimal Logic.
• A A is equivalent to A in Minimal Logic.
Proof.
• We have (∀x.¬P )
Since A = ∃x.P , by ∃-Introduction we obtain P → A. We conclude that (1) above is equivalent to ∀x.(A → A), hence it is derivable.
• We have
By the previous point, (∀x.¬P ) A is derivable in minimal logic. We conclude that A A is equivalent to A in minimal logic.
Π 0 2 -Conservativity is an immediate consequence of Friedman Topmost Trick. Assume we may prove A = ∃x.P in PA, with P equational. Then in MA we may prove A A , hence A. We conclude HA A, Q. E. D..
Proving Generalizing Conservativity
Our goal is now to extend the Conservativity result to A = ∃x.P (x, y), with deg(P ) = k, and to PA, HA + EM k . Therefore we have to extend Friedman Topmost Trick as follows: in HA + EM k , we may prove both (∀x.¬P ) A , and A A ↔ A. 
We assume B∨A and we have to prove C ∨A. 
. We use B ∨ ¬B and C ∨ ¬C. If B or C, then (B ∨ C) ∨ A. If both ¬B, ¬C, we deduce (B ∨ A) → A and (C ∨ A) → A. By definition, we obtain ¬ A (B ∨ A), ¬ A (C ∨ A) and ¬ A (B ∨ A) ∧ ¬ A (C ∨ A).
Our assumption is the A-negation of this latter: we conclude A. 
• (∃). ⇒. Assume (∃x.E) ∨ A, in order to prove ∃ A x.(E ∨ A). By definition of ∃ A , we assume ∀x.¬ A (E ∨ A) and we have to prove

A. The new assumption unfolds to ∀x.((E ∨A) → A).
Lemma 4.2 (Avigad Lemma) If deg(F
Assume F is any equation. Then F ∨ ¬F holds in HA, and the thesis is ( (F → A) 
We may now derive a generalization of Friedman Topmost Trick, and generalized Conservativity out of it.
Lemma 4.3 (Generalized Friedman Topmost Trick) Fix any
• (∀x.¬P ) A is derivable in HA + EM k .
• A A is equivalent to A in HA + EM k .
Proof.
• We have (∀x.¬P ) A = ∀ A x.¬ A P A = ∀x. (P A → A) . By Avigad's Lemma, this latter is equivalent to ∀x.
By the previous point, (∀x.¬P ) A is derivable in HA + EM k . We conclude that A A is equivalent to A in HA + EM k . 
Proof. Assume we may prove
A = ∃x.P in PA, with deg(P ) = k. Then in MA we may prove A A . By HA + EM k A A ↔ A, we conclude HA + EM k A, Q.E.D. .
Discussing the result
We claim that using Generalized Conservativity we may find some constructive content in any Classical Arithmetical proof, not just in proofs of Π 0 2 -statements. For instance, fix any recursive map f : N → N , any a ∈ N , and consider the following Minimum Principle M : "f has a minimum point x", in symbols M = ∃x.∀y.f (x) ≤ f (y). M is a Σ 0 2 statement, hence Σ 0 1 -conservativity does not apply to it. Indeed, M is derivable in PA, but not in HA. 6 Generalized Conservativity says that we 6 M is provable in PA. Assume, for contradiction, that M is false (we are using EM 2 here). Then, using Classical Logic again, ∀x.∃y.f (x) > f (y). We will prove, by total induction over v ∈ N , that for all c ∈ N we have f (c) > v. By induction hypothesis, we assume therefore that f In fact, the definition of φ reflects the ideas in p. φ uses the oracle O to produce some decreasing chain f (a) > f (a ) > f (a") . . ., terminating because N is well-founded. When the chain stops, it stops in some c such that f (c) ≤ f (y) for all y. φ is well-defined in Classical Arithmetic. The obvious objection against a constructive use of φ is that we cannot compute y = φ(x). But we may think of φ(x) as a formal notation, which we are able to turn into a real integer whenever we used it to solve a concrete problem. Suppose for instance we have an inequality f (t) ≤ f (t + 27) (This example is due to T. Coquand). We may solve it using any minimum point y = φ(0) of f . We define in this way a proof of a simple existential statement ∃t.f (t) ≤ f (t + 27) in Classical Arithmetic. Using Σ 0 1 -conservativity, we may turn it into some constructive proof of the same result, effectively defining some t ∈ N such that f (t) ≤ f (t+27). After a careful work over the classical proof (not to be included here) we conclude that the definition of t is the following variant of the definition of φ. We look for the first point in which the succession f (0) > f (27) > f (27+27) > f (27+27+27) > . . . stops decreasing (for the first 27i such that f (27i) ≤ f (27i+27)). Definition of t retains ideas from the definition of φ(0) (but the oracle O of φ is now gone).
In general, we claim: by Σ 0 1 -conservativity, we may use ∆ 0 k -maps in constructive reasoning, to describe ideas in classical proofs of Σ 0 kstatements. This is because we may eventually get rid of them when proving Σ 0 1 -statements. We also have a more elaborate argument. In a previous paper [1] we defined an intuitionistic model N of ∆ 0 k -maps.
Thus, it is sound to use ∆ 0 k -maps in intuitionistic reasoning.
The role of Generalized Conservativity is to provide a bound to the complexity of non-recursive maps we may have to use. Suppose we have a classical arithmetical proof p of a Σ 0 k -statement. By Generalized Conservativity we may describe the ideas in p using only ∆ 0 k -maps. The bound k is independent from the degree of Excluded Middle we use in p. It only depends on the degree of the conclusion of p. In the previous example, a proof p of a Σ 0 2 -statement using EM 2 may be turned into a proof q using only EM 1 . The constructive content of q is then some ∆ 0 2 -map φ. Whenever we use A as a Lemma in a proof of some Σ 0 1 -statement ∃x.P (x), then by Σ 0 1 -conservativity we may use some suitable recursive variant φ of φ to compute x.
